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COMMENT 
Polluting Without Consequence: How BP and 
Other Large Government Contractors Evade 
Suspension and Debarment for 
Environmental Crime and Misconduct 
JUSTIN M. DAVIDSON* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Like any business, the federal government has a strong 
interest in conducting business with trustworthy, responsible, 
and ethical corporate partners.  The government relies on 
approved and qualified contractors to provide critical goods and 
services that allow the government to function smoothly and 
properly.  Because some companies with whom the government 
contracts with might commit environmental crime or engage in 
environmental misconduct, the government is uniquely situated 
to regulate such business activities to protect themselves and the 
public from contracting with irresponsible and unethical entities 
who have engaged in such wrongdoing. 
The government can protect itself from conducting business 
with criminal or irresponsible contractors through the process of 
suspension and debarment.  Under this doctrine, government 
contractors who commit a criminal or civil offense, engage in 
corporate misconduct, or otherwise act irresponsibly in connection 
with a held government contract are prevented from obtaining 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Certificate of Environmental Law, Pace University School of 
Law, 2012.  B.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2007.  I would like to 
thank Mr. Mike Walker, U.S. EPA, for his guidance and support throughout this 
undertaking, as well as members of the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 
editorial staff for their comments and suggestions during the editing process. 
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future government contracts and nonprocurement transactions.1  
With this authority, suspension and debarment are necessary 
and powerful tools available to all federal agencies to ensure that 
the government continues doing business only with honest and 
responsible contractors. 
To that end, suspension and debarment has, for the most 
part, been effective in protecting the government from 
irresponsible and unethical small partners or individuals.  
However, as this Comment argues, current practice as regulated 
under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is largely 
ineffective and underutilized to adequately protect the 
government and public interest from large corporate partners 
engaging in environmentally irresponsible or unethical conduct.  
This Comment suggests that certain reforms to the FAR and a 
greater willingness to initiate suspension and debarment 
proceedings by federal agencies against large corporate entities 
who commit environmental crimes or misconduct will improve 
environmental compliance and properly hold contractors 
responsible for their environmental wrongdoings. 
Part II of this Comment lays out the relevant historical and 
regulatory framework underlying the suspension and debarment 
regime, focusing on the procedural and substantive rules that are 
specified in the FAR.  Part III of this Comment discusses 
suspension and debarment in the context of environmental 
crimes and misconduct, particularly emphasizing how corporate 
environmental behavior is treated under the FAR and how the 
EPA’s suspension and debarment program has evolved over the 
years.  Part IV of this Comment investigates British Petroleum, 
Inc. (BP) as a case study, analyzing its history of environmental 
noncompliance, utilizing Deepwater Horizon as a backdrop.  The 
 
 1. Nonprocurement transactions are “any transaction [other than] 
procurement contract transactions,” including but not limited to grants, 
cooperative agreements, scholarships, loans, subsidies, insurances, and 
contracts of assistance.  See 2 C.F.R. § 180.970(a) (2010).  Although 
nonprocurement transactions are covered under the Nonprocurement Common 
Rule (NCR), Government-wide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement) 
and Government-wide Requirements for Drug-Free Workplace (Grants), 68 Fed. 
Reg. 66,534 (Nov. 26, 2003) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 970), this Comment 
focuses primarily on the effects of suspension and debarment on agency 
procurement actions. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6
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Part goes on to discuss how a large company like BP has 
effectively evaded the arm of company-wide discretionary 
debarment and investigates the legal framework for such evasion.  
Finally, Part V of this Comment analyzes the flaws in the current 
debarment regime and offers proposals for reforming the system 
and ensuring compliance with the environmental statutes and 
the purposes of suspension and debarment as a whole. 
II. BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
A. Introduction to Suspension and Debarment Under 
the FAR 
Suspension and debarment are actions that the federal 
government takes to prevent certain businesses and individuals 
from obtaining government contracts and nonprocurement 
transactions when that entity has committed a criminal or civil 
offense, engaged in corporate misconduct, or otherwise acted 
irresponsibly in connection with a held government contract.2  
The suspension and debarment process is a means for 
determining a contractor’s present responsibility to do business 
with the government and for protecting the public interest—it is 
not intended to be used as a means of punishing participants or 
contractors.  Rather, the process focuses on whether the 
respondent has demonstrated a lack of business integrity or 
business honesty, an inability to perform government contracts in 
a satisfactory manner, or whether some other factor has a serious 
and direct effect on their present responsibility.  If a contractor is 
determined to no longer be presently responsible and is 
subsequently suspended or debarred, they are prohibited from 
 
 2. See e.g., FAR 2.01 (2011) (defining “debarment” as an “action taken by a 
debarring official under [FAR] 9.406 to exclude a contractor from Government 
contracting and Government-approved subcontracting for a reasonable, specified 
period; a contractor that is excluded is ‘debarred.’”  “Suspension” is defined as 
“action taken by a suspending official under [FAR] 9.407 to disqualify a 
contractor temporarily from Government contracting and Government-approved 
subcontracting; a contractor that is disqualified is ‘suspended’.” See also FAR 
9.4. 
3
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receiving or being awarded new contracts, subcontracts, or 
nonprocurement grants for a specified period of time.3 
B. Purpose and Policy Considerations 
The two primary goals underlying the suspension and 
debarment regime are (1) to protect the government from 
business relations with dishonest, unethical, criminal, or 
otherwise irresponsible contractors or persons; and (2) to induce 
compliance with national socioeconomic programs.4  The federal 
government protects the public interest by ensuring the integrity 
of federal programs by conducting business only with responsible 
persons.  The government does not want to contract with 
companies or persons who have demonstrated a lack of business 
integrity or honesty and an inability to perform government 
contracts in a satisfactory manner, or who have engaged in such 
conduct as to have a serious and direct effect on their present 
responsibility. 
It is easy to confuse the purposes and effects of the 
suspension and debarment process with agency enforcement 
mechanisms.  A common misconception about suspension and 
debarment is that it is used to punish contractors for 
irresponsible or illicit conduct; after all, the effect of being barred 
from holding government contracts for a specified period of time 
has serious business implications.  However, suspension and 
debarment is imposed only to protect the government and public 
interest from conducting business with unethical or irresponsible 
partners; it is strictly a business decision and is not meant to be 
punitive.5  As explained by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
“The security of the United States, and thus of the general public, 
depends upon the quality and reliability of items supplied by 
those contractors. . . . Debarment reduces the risk of harm to the 
 
 3. FAR 9.405(a). 
 4. See generally Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited: 
Fewer Eggs in the Basket?, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 363 (1995) (discussing 
government’s effort to protect the public through the suspension and debarment 
process). 
 5. See FAR 9.402(b). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6
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system by eliminating the source of the risk, that is, the unethical 
or incompetent contractor.”6 
C. Differences Between Suspension and Debarment 
There are three chief differences between suspension and 
debarment: (1) the length of exclusion; (2) the standard of proof 
needed to make an official agency determination; and (3) the 
timing of the imposition of the proceeding.  First, debarment 
imposes a much lengthier term of exclusion upon the contractor 
than suspension.  Generally, a debarring official imposes 
debarment for a specified period that is “commensurate with the 
seriousness of the cause(s)” as a final determination that a person 
or company is not presently responsible, generally not to exceed 
three years.7  However, although the FAR provides guidance of 
up to three years’ exclusion,8 it is not limited to three years, and 
longer periods of debarment may be imposed where 
circumstances warrant if the debarring official determines that 
an extension is necessary to protect the government’s interest.9  
For example, one court found that an agency’s decision to debar a 
contractor for fifteen years was reasonable.10  So long as the 
debarring agency has a “reasonable basis” on which to fix the 
period of debarment, a reviewing court cannot substitute its 
judgment of an appropriate period for debarment.11 
In contrast to debarment, suspension is imposed as a 
temporary status of ineligibility for procurement and 
nonprocurement transactions, pending completion of an 
investigation or legal proceeding when it is determined that 
immediate action is necessary to protect the government’s 
 
 6. Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 7. FAR 9.406-4(a)(1). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 9.406-4(b). 
 10. See Coccia v. Def. Logistics Agency, Civ. A. No. 89-6544, 1992 WL 345106, 
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1992) (agreeing with plaintiff’s attorney that 
“[A]lthough a debarment generally is imposed for three years, there is no 
maximum period.  The Government thus is free to impose longer periods in 
egregious circumstances that present an unusual threat to the Government’s 
business interests.”). 
 11. See Shane Meat Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 800 F.2d 334, 336-39 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
5
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interest.12  Generally, this temporary period of exclusion cannot 
exceed eighteen months, but if a legal proceeding has been 
initiated within that period, the suspension can last as long as 
such proceeding is ongoing, including any appeal.13  For example, 
in Frequency Electronics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force,14 the 
Fourth Circuit upheld a suspension throughout the nearly five-
year period of legal proceedings before an indictment was made.15 
Second, the standard of proof required for an agency 
determination differs between suspension and debarment.  A 
debarring official must conclude based on a preponderance of the 
evidence that the contractor has engaged in conduct that 
warrants debarment, whereas a suspending official, on the other 
hand, can impose a suspension “on the basis of adequate evidence, 
pending the completion of investigation or legal proceedings, 
when it has been determined that immediate action is necessary 
to protect the Government’s interest.”16 
Third, debarment is imposed only after giving the respondent 
notice of the action and an opportunity to contest the proposed 
debarment (through a “notice of proposed debarment”).  
Suspension, in contrast, is usually imposed first by the 
suspending official, who promptly notifies the suspended person 
and provides the person an opportunity to contest the suspension 
and have it removed.17 
D. Types of Debarment Actions: Discretionary and 
Statutory 
There are two types of debarment proceedings available to a 
debarring official: (1) discretionary debarment and (2) statutory 
debarment.  Under discretionary debarment, agencies may 
suspend or debar a contractor based on their discretion for any of 
a number of causes set out in the FAR.  Such causes include, but 
 
 12. FAR 9.407-1(b)(1). 
 13. Id. at 9.407-4(a) to (b). 
 14. 151 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 15. Id. at 1035. 
 16. See FAR 9.406-3(d)(3) (debarment standard of proof) and FAR 9.407-
1(b)(1) (suspension standard of proof). 
 17. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6
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are not limited to: (a) criminal and civil violations, such as the 
commission of fraud or a criminal offense related to obtaining or 
performing a government contract; (b) unsatisfactory 
performance of public contracts and transactions, such as the 
willful failure to perform in accordance with the terms of one of 
more public contracts, a history of unsatisfactory performance, or 
failure to perform one or more contracts; (c) certain labor and 
trade violations or commission of an unfair trade practice; or (d) 
acting in any other way that demonstrates a “lack of business 
integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects 
the present responsibility of the contractor.”18 
Statutory debarment refers to the automatic or mandatory 
debarment of contractors for violations of certain federal statutes 
that include debarment provisions.  In the environmental law 
context, both the Clean Water Act (CWA)19 and Clean Air Act 
(CAA)20 contain debarment provisions prohibiting federal 
agencies from entering into contracts with persons convicted of a 
criminal offense falling under the criminal penalty sections of the 
respective statutes.21  The primary purpose of statutory 
debarment under the CWA and CAA is to undertake federal 
procurement activities in a manner that improves and enhances 
environmental quality by promoting effective enforcement of the 
Acts.  The Acts both provide (nearly identically): “The prohibition 
[of contracting with contractors who have violated the respective 
criminal provisions] shall continue until the Administrator 
certifies that the condition giving rise to such conviction has been 
corrected.”22  In implementing and enforcing the CWA and CAA, 
EPA’s objective is not merely to require that the facility stop the 
violation or remove contamination resulting from the violation, 
but also to require a demonstration that management has reacted 
 
 18. FAR 9.406-2(a). 
 19. Clean Water Act [CWA] §§ 101—607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251—1387 (2006). 
 20. Clean Air Act [CAA] §§ 101—618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401—7671 (2006). 
 21. E.g., CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (“No Federal agency may enter 
into any contract with any person, who has been convicted of any offense under 
section 1319(c) of this title, for the procurement of goods, materials and services 
. . . .”); CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (“No Federal agency may enter into 
any contract with any person who is convicted of any offense under section 
7413(c) of this title for the procurement of goods, materials, and services. . . .”). 
 22. CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a); CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a). 
7
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responsibly to the event and will monitor and assure that 
violations are not likely to recur in the future.23 
While environmentalists and proponents of a strong 
suspension and debarment regime might applaud the automatic 
and mandatory nature of statutory debarment on its face, this 
classification is misleading.  A critical feature of statutory 
debarment is that it tends to be less severe than its discretionary 
debarment counterpart, despite its requirement for automatic or 
mandatory action.  Unlike discretionary debarment, statutory 
debarment typically prohibits the government from granting 
contracts or subcontracts only to the specific facility where the 
accident or violation happened.24  As discussed in greater detail 
in Part IV, infra, this means that large corporations owning and 
operating multiple facilities will not necessarily be debarred for 
civil violations or criminal convictions under the CWA and CAA, 
only that the specific facility where the violation occurred will be 
debarred.  This could provide a legal loophole that allows large 
companies with multiple facilities that systematically violate 
CWA and CAA provisions to avoid the full impact of debarment 
since they will, as a company on the whole, be able to continue 
doing business with the government. 
E. Determination of Present Responsibility under 
Discretionary Suspension and Debarment 
In determining whether to suspend or propose to debar a 
contractor, the Suspension or Debarment Official (SDO) must 
determine whether a respondent is “presently responsible” and 
whether debarment is in the government’s interest.25  The 
criteria used in making that determination differs depending on 
whether the contractor is being considered for suspension or 
proposed for debarment.  A debarring official must consider a 
 
 23. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and 
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,619 (Apr. 11, 2000). 
 24. See, e.g., CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (“. . . [prohibited from 
entering into contracts] if such contract is to be performed at any facility at 
which the violation which gave rise to such conviction occurred, and if such 
facility is owned, leased, or supervised by such person.”) (emphasis added); 
Clean Air Act § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. §7606(a) (same). 
 25. See FAR 9.406-1(a). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6
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number of mitigating factors before mandating the debarment 
action, including whether the contractor: (1) had an internal 
control system and effective standards of conduct in place during 
the activity that is the cause of the debarment, or adopted such 
procedures prior to any government investigation of the activity; 
(2) brought the activity to the attention of the appropriate 
government agency in a timely or voluntary manner; (3) 
undertook a full  investigation involving the circumstances 
surrounding the cause for debarment and, if so, allowed the 
debarring official to examine the results; (4) fully cooperated with 
government agencies, any court, or any administrative proceeding 
during the investigation; (5) paid all criminal, civil, and 
administrative liability related to their conduct; (6) took 
appropriate disciplinary action against the individuals 
responsible for the improper activity; (7) implemented or agreed 
to implement remedial measures; (8) instituted new or revised 
review and control procedures and ethics training programs; (9) 
had sufficient time to eliminate the circumstances within the 
organization which led to the cause for debarment; and (10) that 
the contractor’s management recognized and understood the 
seriousness of the misconduct giving rise to the cause for 
debarment and had implemented programs to prevent 
recurrence.26 
A suspending official, on the other hand, does not have the 
same restrictions and guidelines that a debarring official has 
under the FAR.  Just because a cause for suspension may exist 
does not necessarily require that the contractor be suspended; in 
view of the seriousness of the contractor’s acts or omissions, the 
suspending official may consider certain remedial measures or 
mitigating factors in deciding whether to suspend a contractor.27  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that “the existence or 
nonexistence of any remedial measures or mitigating factors is 
 
 26. Id. at 9.406-1(a)(1) to (10). 
 27. See id. at 9.407-1(b)(2) (“A contractor has the burden of promptly 
presenting to the suspending official evidence of remedial measures or 
mitigating factors when it has reason to know that a cause for suspension 
exists.”). 
9
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not necessarily determinative of a contractor’s present 
responsibility.”28 
F. Effects of Suspension and Debarment 
When a contractor is suspended or proposed for debarment, it 
is immediately placed on the General Services Administration 
(GSA) Excluded Party List System (EPLS) (also known as the 
“GSA List”).29  The EPLS is essentially a “blacklist” of contractors 
compiled, maintained, and distributed by the GSA containing the 
names, addresses, and identity of parties debarred, suspended, or 
voluntarily excluded from federal contracting.30  A contractor 
placed on the EPLS is excluded from receiving government 
contracts and subcontracts subject to federal approval, and 
agencies are not to solicit offers from, award contracts to, or 
consent to subcontracts with contractors on the GSA List unless 
the procuring agency’s head or designee determines that there is 
a “compelling reason” for contracting with the excluded party.31  
Contracting officers cannot even evaluate the offers of contractors 
or include them in the competitive range for evaluation of other 
offerors.32  Additionally, contractors are also excluded from 
conducting business with the Government as agents or 
representatives of other contractors when such entity has been 
debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment.33 
The consequences of being placed on the GSA List can be 
severe and quite expansive, regardless of whether the contractor 
is temporarily suspended or debarred for a longer term.  After all, 
“[a] contractor withering away without the ability to compete 
does not value the artificial legal distinction between debarment 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 2.101 (defining  EPLS); see also id. at 9.404 (providing more 
information on EPLS and GSA). 
 30. Id. at 2.101; see also id. at 9.404.  “Voluntary exclusion” refers to a 
contractor’s settlement with the government whereby the contractor voluntarily 
chooses to exclude itself from participating in government contracting or 
subcontracting for a specified period or because of a Notice of Proposal to Debar. 
See 48 C.F.R. § 1509.406-3(a)(3)(vi). 
 31. FAR 9.405(a). 
 32. Id. at 9.405(d)(3). 
 33. Id. at 9.405(a). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6
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and temporary debarment when the practical effects are 
identical.”34  The effect of a suspension or debarment is 
government-wide,35 meaning, for instance, that if a company is 
debarred by the EPA for environmental misconduct, that same 
company cannot receive future contracts or subcontracts by other 
federal agencies, like the Department of Defense or Department 
of Labor, until that company has been removed from the GSA 
List entirely.  Discretionary debarment decisions ordinarily apply 
to all divisions and other organizational units of a company, 
unless specifically limited by the terms of the decision.36  This 
means that a discretionary debarment affects the entire company, 
and not just disparate business units or facilities.  The agency 
has considerable discretion in deciding the scope for which 
suspension and debarment actions may apply.  For instance, 
depending on the nature and extent of improper activity, 
exclusion from contracting can be imputed to: the contractor as 
an entity based on the fraudulent, criminal, or seriously improper 
conduct of its employees and officials (officers, directors, 
shareholders, partners, or other individuals associated with the 
organization); employees as individuals based on the conduct of 
the contractor; individuals based upon the misconduct of another 
individual; extension to affiliates; and participants in a joint 
venture.37 
Additionally, there may be other collateral consequences felt 
by the debarred entity beyond the ability to contract with the 
government alone.  First and foremost, there is the potentially 
devastating financial impact on contractors who depend on 
contracts with the government to remain viable but who are 
excluded from competing.38  The ramifications of being found 
guilty of criminal environmental violations can also severely 
 
 34. Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination and 
Critique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including a 
Discussion of the Mandatory Disclosure Rule, the IBM Suspension, and Other 
Noteworthy Developments, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 547, 551 (2009). 
 35. FAR 9.401. 
 36. Id. at 9.406-1(b). 
 37. Id. at 9.406-5. 
 38. See Canni, supra note 34, at 551 (“This is especially so for small to 
medium-sized businesses focusing solely on government business that may lack 
the financial means to remain viable during the period of exclusion.”). 
11
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injure the reputation of a business for years to come.39  Other 
examples of non-federal effects include: ineligibility to contract 
with state/local governments;40 denial or revocation of export 
licenses;41 denial, suspension, or revocation of an organization’s 
security clearance;42 or a material financial impact to commercial 
sales because publicly held companies may need to disclose the 
potential financial impact of suspension or debarment in their 
public disclosures required by federal securities law (i.e., 
quarterly or annual reports). 
III. SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME AND 
MISCONDUCT 
Just like any other proper cause for suspension or 
debarment, a company or individual may be suspended or 
debarred by a federal agency for waste, fraud, abuse, poor 
performance, noncompliance, or other criminal behavior 
associated with environmental misconduct.  The EPA’s 
debarment program is governed by Executive Order 12,549, 
EPA’s own nonprocurement debarment regulation, 40 CFR Part 
32, and by the FAR, 49 CFR Part 9.  EPA is unique in its role as 
steward of environmental protection in that it is one of only three 
federal government agencies to have a full-time debarment office 
devoted to determining the present responsibility of federal 
contractors and for issuing suspension and debarment 
 
 39. Carol Dinkins & Sean Lonnquist, The Belt and Suspenders Approach: 
The Advantages of a Formalized Environmental Compliance Program, 2009 
UTAH L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2009). 
 40. Some states follow the ABA Model Procurement Code for State and Local 
Governments (2000), while others have directly written suspension and 
debarment provisions directly into their state statutes or regulations.  See, e.g., 
Procurement Lobbying Guidelines, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE (2006), 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/procurement/lobby.htm; see also Debarment Information, 
N.Y. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/publicwork/ 
PWDebarmentInformation.shtm (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 41. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(5). 
 42. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY REGULATION 5220.22-R, 
§ C2.1.12.7, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022r. 
pdf  (explaining that because “[d]ebarment and suspension actions . . . are 
considered pertinent from a security interest point of view,” facilities listed on 
the GSA list “would normally be ineligible for a security clearance.”). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6
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decisions.43  Other federal agencies with authority to suspend or 
debar, in contrast, have only part-time debarring officials who 
typically work for the agency’s respective procurement office.  
Debarring officers who work for the very procurement offices 
responsible for arranging and securing federal contracts might 
face a potential conflict of interest when determining a proper 
cause of action concerning a contractor’s actions. An agency that 
possesses its own Suspension and Debarment Office separate 
from its procurement office, like the EPA,44 is theoretically able 
to remove itself from any such potential conflicts and focus its 
efforts strictly on the business decision of whether to suspend or 
debar a contractor. 
The EPA’s debarment program began in 1982 as an attempt 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to respond to 
and correct Government-wide inadequacies in the management of 
federal contracts and assistance with regard to waste, fraud, 
abuse, and poor performance.45  This “comprehensive 
Government-wide debarment and suspension system” developed 
by OMB applied to all federal contracts, assistance, loans and 
benefits extended by Executive-Branch agencies, including 
EPA.46 
In addition to EPA’s discretionary authority to debar,47 it 
also has mandatory debarment authority under section 306 of the 
Clean Air Act48 and section 508 of the Clean Water Act.49  
Substantially, the texts of the provisions are identical: 
No Federal agency may enter into any contract with any person 
who is convicted of any offense under [CAA § 113(c) or CWA § 
309(c)] . . . for the procurement of goods, materials, and services 
 
 43. The other two federal agencies containing full-time debarment offices are 
the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. 
 44. See Suspension & Debarment Program, EPA OFFICE OF GRANTS & 
DEBARMENT, http://www.epa.gov/ogd/sdd/debarment.htm (last updated Apr. 8, 
2011). 
 45. See A Brief History of EPA’s Debarment Program, EPA OFFICE OF GRANTS 
& DEBARMENT, http://www.epa.gov/ogd/sdd/history.htm (last updated Jan. 14, 
2010). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See supra Part II.D. 
 48. CAA § 306, 42 U.S.C. § 7606. 
 49. CWA § 508, 42 U.S.C. § 1368. 
13
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to perform such contract at any facility at which the violation 
which gave rise to such conviction occurred if such facility is 
owned, leased, or supervised by such person. The prohibition in 
the preceding sentence shall continue until the Administrator 
certifies that the condition giving rise to such a conviction has 
been corrected.50 
In line with these congressional mandates, it is the national 
policy of the federal government to 
. . . improve and enhance environmental quality. In furtherance 
of that policy, the [debarment] program [mandates] . . . [are] 
instituted to assure that each Federal agency empowered to enter 
into contracts for the procurement of goods, materials, or services 
and each Federal agency empowered to extend Federal assistance 
by way of grant, loan, or contract shall undertake such 
procurement and assistance activities in a manner that will 
result in effective enforcement of the Clean Air Act . . . and the . . 
. [Clean Water Act].51 
Originally, the EPA divided its suspension and debarment 
program into three offices: the Office of Enforcement (statutory 
debarment); the Procurement and Contracts Management 
Division (procurement debarment); and the Grants 
Administration Division (assistance debarment).52  In 1982, the 
discretionary procurement and assistance debarment authority 
was consolidated into the Grants Administration Division by the 
Office of Administration and Resource Management (OARM).53  
Then, in the early 1990s, the Agency further consolidated its 
debarment program into the Office of Grants and Debarment 
(OGD), located within the Office of Enforcement, where “all EPA 
discretionary and statutory debarment authority is delegated to 
the Assistant Administrator for OARM and [is] carried out by the 
 
 50. CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. §7606(a); see also CWA § 508(a), 33 U.S.C. § 
1368(a). 
 51. Exec. Order No. 11,738, 38 Fed. Reg. 25,161, 25,161 (Sept. 10, 1973). 
 52. A Brief History of EPA’s Debarment Program, EPA OFFICE OF GRANTS & 
DEBARMENT, http://www.epa.gov/ogd/sdd/history.htm (last updated Jan. 14, 
2011). 
 53. Id. 
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Office of Grants and Debarment (OGD).”54  According to the EPA 
website: 
The Suspension and Debarment Division (SDD) [a division 
within the OGD] interacts with EPA program offices, the Office 
of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, and with 
federal, state and local agencies, to develop matters for 
consideration by the EPA Debarring Official. . . .  The EPA 
Debarring Official is the Agency’s national program manager.  As 
such, the EPA Debarring Official establishes the Agency’s 
debarment policy, and is the decision official for all suspension 
and debarment actions before the Agency.55 
The separation of suspension and debarment decisions from 
procurement decisions and the merger of debarment roles into 
one office represent EPA’s efforts to combine its vast contracting 
resources with its considerable enforcement clout.56 
Besides the legislative and regulatory directives, EPA follows 
a number of guidance documents and internal memoranda to help 
base their suspension and debarment decisions connected with 
environmental conduct.  Of particular note, EPA has a Voluntary 
Disclosure Program, the purpose of which is to “enhance 
protection of human health and the environment by encouraging 
regulated entities to voluntarily discover, promptly disclose and 
expeditiously correct violations of Federal environmental 
requirements.”57  By providing incentives for regulated entities to 
detect, promptly disclose, and expeditiously correct violations of 
federal environmental law, the Policy sets forth nine conditions, 
which if met by regulated entities, may allow them to become 
eligible for 100 percent mitigation of any gravity-based penalties 
that could otherwise be assessed.58  Such conditions include: (1) 
systematic discovery of the violation through an Environmental 
Audit or a Compliance Management System; (2) voluntary 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Memorandum from Jonathan S. Cole, Senior Attorney, EPA (on file with 
author). 
 57. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and 
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) (known as 
the “EPA Voluntary Disclosure Program”). 
 58. Id. 
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discovery; (3) prompt disclosure; (4) discovery and disclosure 
independent of government or third party plaintiff; (5) correction 
and remediation; (6) prevent recurrence; (7) no repeat violations; 
(8) violations not resulting in serious actual harm to the 
environment or present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to public health or the environment; and (9) 
cooperation with Agency investigation.59 
With all these legislative, executive, and administrative 
mandates, EPA has a generally strong debarment program for 
ensuring that the Agency is only conducting business with 
presently responsible partners.  As evinced by their Voluntary 
Disclosure Program, EPA is primarily concerned about “whether 
any mitigating factors or remedial measures show that the 
business risk of dealing with the individual has been eliminated 
to the extent that debarment is unnecessary.”60 
As an example of the reach of EPA’s concerns, in Burke v. 
EPA, the D.C. District Court upheld a five-year debarment of a 
landfill operator by the EPA, concluding that EPA’s five-year 
debarment was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion.61  In that case, Paul Burke, the owner and sole 
shareholder of an Alabama landfill, negligently discharged 
excessive amounts of leachate, a liquid by-product produced in 
landfills, into a creek in violation of the CWA.62  The negligent 
discharge of leachate resulted in the contamination of a direct 
drinking water source for residents of Birmingham, Alabama.63  
Concluding that Burke’s criminal conviction provided cause for 
debarment and that Burke did not demonstrate sufficient 
mitigating factors or remedial measures showing that debarment 
was unnecessary, EPA found that a five-year, as opposed to a 
three-year, period of debarment was warranted under the 
circumstances.64  Particularly, because the factual misconduct 
providing the basis for Burke’s criminal conviction “show[ed] a 
serious lack of business responsibility,” EPA did not act 
 
 59. Id. at 19,621-23. 
 60. Burke v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 2d 235, 240 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 61. Id. at 242-43. 
 62. Id. at 236-37. 
 63. Id. at 237. 
 64. Id. at 242. 
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arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that a nexus existed between 
Burke’s criminal conviction and his business integrity.65  In 
making its determination, the EPA Debarring Official considered 
and evaluated relevant mitigating factors such as Burke’s 
culpability, the seriousness of the misconduct, the time that had 
elapsed, appropriate remedial measures taken, court-imposed 
sanctions, character before and after the offense, and compliance 
with the consent order.66  Ultimately, however, EPA found that 
“[o]nly when Mr. Burke was forced into a position of compliance 
by [Alabama Department of Environmental Management] did he 
begin to implement actions that should have been a part of the 
daily operation of [the landfill] . . . [and] Mr. Burke has not 
presented persuasive evidence of altered personal business 
conduct which demonstrates that he now does not pose a risk to 
the government.”67  Therefore, a five-year debarment was 
appropriate rather than the common three-year period.  Even 
though debarment is generally imposed for a three-year period, a 
longer time frame is permitted when “extension is necessary to 
protect the Government’s interest.”68 
The wide discretion given to EPA and high level of 
consideration it places on a contractor’s mitigation and 
remediation practices were similarly demonstrated when EPA 
suspended IBM Corporation.  On March 27, 2008, following an 
investigation, EPA found that IBM employees obtained protected 
source selection information from an EPA employee and used the 
information during its negotiations to improve its chance of 
winning a government contract.  IBM officials knew this 
information was improperly acquired in violation of federal 
procurement procedures and the Federal Procurement Policy 
Integrity Act.69  Here, the EPA Debarring Official determined 
that “immediate action was necessary to preclude an award of a 
federal contract to an offeror whose employees may have 
 
 65. Burke, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 240. 
 66. Id. at 241. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See FAR 9.406-4(b). 
 69. IBM Corp., EPA Interim Agreement, EPA Case No. 08-0113-00 (Apr. 13, 
2008), http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/32/cases/903/1179/ 
ibm-suspension_agreement.pdf. 
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participated in illegal activities in receiving and using 
information about its competitors’ bid and other information to 
increase its chance of winning the contract award.”70  However, 
the suspension was lifted one week later on April 3, 2008, because 
of IBM’s prompt response to the suspension.  Upon receiving the 
Notice of Suspension, IBM management officials and counsel 
initiated an immediate ‘high priority’ internal investigation into 
the allegations and promptly took steps to remediate and 
mitigate the situation.  The remedial and mitigating actions 
taken by IBM included (1) publicly acknowledging the 
seriousness of the offense; (2) withdrawing its offer from further 
consideration in the subject procurement; (3) refunding attorney 
fees and costs to EPA; (4) pledging IBM’s full commitment to 
conduct an examination of the company’s federal compliance 
program and taking whatever corrective actions necessary; (4) 
placing responsible individuals on administrative leave; and (5) 
agreeing to cooperate fully with EPA and the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in bringing the matter to a prompt and appropriate 
conclusion.71  Based on IBM’s forthright representations and 
offers of remediation and mitigation made, EPA agreed to 
immediately terminate the suspension imposed on March 27, 
2008 and remove IBM’s name from the Excluded Parties List.72 
IV. CASE STUDY: BP AS GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTOR 
British Petroleum, Inc. (BP) is one of the world’s largest oil 
and gas companies.  In addition to supplying fuel, heat, and 
energy to individual consumers around the globe, BP is also an 
enormous contractor with the United States government, whose 
contracts generate revenues in the billions of dollars annually.  In 
fact, BP is the Pentagon’s largest single supplier of fuel, providing 
nearly twelve percent of the total fuel purchased in fiscal year 
(FY) 2009, and having contracts worth at least $980 million in FY 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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2010.73  In the Middle East, BP supplies eighty percent of the fuel 
used by the military in the war effort.74  Additionally, BP 
operates 22,000 oil and gas wells across the United States, many 
located on federal lands or waters75.  These wells produce thirty-
nine percent of the company’s total global revenue, about $16 
billion.76  As a government contractor, BP’s actions as a business 
partner of the federal government fall under the scrutiny of 
debarment provisions in the FAR. 
Despite this large presence in federal contracting, BP has a 
long history of incurring both criminal and civil fines and 
penalties—particularly due to environmental accidents, leaks, 
and threats to human health and safety.  Prior to the April 20, 
2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster that made national headline 
news for months, BP had five other major incidents in the past 
ten years, all tallying up major fines and other costs for BP.77  In 
October 2000, BP received a felony conviction for illegally 
dumping hazardous waste down a well hole to cut costs; in a 
settlement, they agreed to a five-year probationary period.78  In 
March 2005, an explosion at a BP Texas City oil refinery—the 
third largest refinery in the United States—claimed the lives of 
fifteen employees and injured 170 others; BP pleaded guilty to a 
felony and paid a $50 million fine in connection with their 
violations under the CAA.79  In March 2006, an oil spill along 
 
 73. R. Jeffrey Smith, BP Has Steady Sales at Defense Department Despite 
U.S. Scrutiny, WASH. POST (July 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/ 07/04/AR2010070403632.html. 
 74. Jason Leopold, Ex-EPA Officials: Why Isn’t BP Under Criminal 
Investigation?, TRUTH-OUT (May 28, 2010), http://www.truth-out.org/ex-epa-
officials-why-isnt-bp-under-criminal-investigation59936. 
 75. Abraham Lustgarten, EPA Officials Weigh Sanctions Against BP’s U.S. 
Operations, PROPUBLICA (May 21, 2010, 12:27 P.M.), http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/epa-officials-weighing-sanctions-against-bps-us-operations. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Leopold, supra note 74. 
 78. Lustgarden, supra note 75. 
 79. Leopold, supra note 74; see also Daniel Schorn, The Explosion at Texas 
City, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 5:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2006/10/26/ 60minutes/main2126509.shtml; see also Ramit Plushnick-Masti, BP 
Texas City Refinery Explosion: Company To Pay State $50 Million Over Air 
Pollution Violations, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2011, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/bp-texas-city-refinery-explosion_n_ 
1074086.html. 
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Alaska’s north coast resulted in more than 200,000 gallons of 
crude oil being spilled into Prudhoe Bay—the largest spill on 
Alaska’s north coast ever.80  The spill was caused by severely 
corroded pipelines for which BP failed to perform routine 
maintenance and upkeep.  Again, BP pleaded guilty to negligent 
discharge of oil, a criminal misdemeanor under the CWA,81 and 
paid $20 million in fines.82  In 2004, BP entered into a Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) related to a price-fixing gas market scheme 
involving propane trading.83  Counting as a conviction under 
debarment law, BP paid a $303 million fine.84 
In the three instances where BP has had a felony or 
misdemeanor criminal conviction levied against it under the CAA 
or CWA, the responsible BP facility where the accident or 
violation occurred faced statutory debarment and the specific 
facility was automatically deemed ineligible to receive any future 
federally-funded contracts, but the company, as a whole, 
proceeded unhindered under a “business as usual” regime.85  
After each incident, BP vowed to make the remedial changes and 
solutions necessary to demonstrate their present responsibility.86  
However, it does not appear that BP has done so.  For instance, 
despite BP’s admission that their written procedures were 
inadequate to ensure its equipment’s safety and that it had failed 
to inform employees of known fire and explosion risks at the 
Texas City refinery, BP did not fix the problems at the rebuilt 
Texas City refinery.87  In fact, in October 2009, the Occupational 
 
 80. Leopold, supra note 74; see also Jason Leopold, Prudhoe Bay, BP’s Other 
Ticking Bomb, CONSORTIUMNEWS.COM (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.consortiumnews.com/Print/2010/061610a.html. 
 81. See CWA § 309(c)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A); see also CWA § 309(f), 
33 U.S.C. 1319(f) (providing for responsible companies to compensate the 
government for the costs of cleanup and remediation for the negligent discharge 
of oil). 
 82. Leopold, supra note 74. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Lustgarten, supra note 75. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Pierre Thomas, BP’s Dismal Safety Record, ABCNEWS.COM (May 27, 
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bps-dismal-safety-record/story?id=10763042#. 
TtFCjmNFu30. 
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Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) fined the company $87 
million for its failure to correct the safety problems at the rebuilt 
Texas City plant, representing the largest fine in OSHA history.88  
In addition, four years after the Prudhoe Bay oil spill, there are 
still “hundreds of miles of rotting pipe ready to break that needs 
[sic] to be replaced,” according to Marc Kovac, a senior BP 
employee who worked on Alaska’s North Slope for more than 
three decades.89  In November 2009, a pipeline rupture at BP 
Alaska’s Lisburne facility demonstrated BP’s failure to learn from 
its past mistakes, in which a February 2001 pipeline ruptured 
under similar circumstances.90  As another example, because of 
overtime benefits and a shortage of trained personnel, BP had a 
history of overworking employees by scheduling them for sixteen 
to eighteen hour work shifts.91  This considerable time provides 
an “imminent safety risk” since working more than sixteen hours 
during a twenty-four hour time period can affect the mental 
capacity to make sound and timely decisions.92  Yet, despite 
assurances by BP to EPA more than ten years ago that the 
company intended to come up with a plan to “fix” the sixteen to 
eighteen work shifts, sixteen-plus hour work shifts were routine 
at Prudhoe Bay in 2009.93 
In evaluating present responsibility, a debarring official shall 
consider whether the contractor has implemented or agreed to 
implement remedial measures,94 such as an ethics and 
compliance program.  Debarring officials expect to see certain 
essential elements in an ethics and compliance program that 
demonstrate the company’s corporate attitude to engage in 
responsible and ethical practices.  Examples include: strong 
support of the program by senior management, demonstrating 
the company’s commitment to high standards of business 
conduct; responsibility of line managers for the program who are 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Leopold, Prudhoe Bay, BP’s Other Ticking Bomb, supra note 80. 
 90. Id. (describing the improper placement of temperature pipe monitors on 
the inside of the facility rather than outside where it could provide a better 
measurement of temperature for both spills). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See FAR 9.406-1(a)(7). 
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accountable for the program’s implementation; accountability to 
the board of directors; procedures for reporting and addressing 
violations; employee training regarding the ethics and compliance 
program; and a demonstrated employee commitment to comply 
with the standards of conduct.95 
The company’s history of continued violations and non-
corrective corporate attitude demonstrates internal institutional 
problems— rather than isolated incidents—that seem to make 
BP, in its entirety, ripe for debarment.  Until now, BP’s 
executives and lawyers have fended off such company-wide 
debarment actions by promising that BP would “change its ways,” 
but despite promises to remedy the problems, many still exist.96  
Aside from the $373 million in fines paid by BP over the past 
decade,97 according to some employees speaking anonymously, 
BP follows an “operate to failure” attitude, meaning that, for 
example, BP Alaska avoids spending money on “upkeep” and 
instead runs the equipment until it breaks down.98  This type of 
procedure typifies what happened in the November 2009 spill, 
when an employee performing a routine check discovered oil 
pouring out from a gash on the bottom of a twenty-five-year old 
pipeline at BP’s facility.99  In other words, an otherwise readily 
identifiable problem made during routine checks was 
systematically ignored for years until there was ultimate failure.  
In the case of the Texas City refinery explosion, BP blamed the 
disaster mostly on operator error and fired six employees; their 
internal investigation report concluded there was “no evidence of 
anyone consciously or intentionally taking actions or decisions 
that put others at risk.”100  However, the U.S. Chemical Safety 
Board, the federal agency that investigated the incident, found 
“[t]he problems that existed at BP Texas City were neither 
momentary nor superficial. They ran deep through that operation 
of a risk denial and a risk blindness that was not being addressed 
 
 95. See id. at 9.406-1(a). 
 96. Lustgarten, supra note 75. 
 97. See Thomas, supra note 87. 
 98. Leopold, Prudhoe Bay, BP’s Other Ticking Bomb, supra note 80. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Schorn, supra note 79. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss1/6
  
2011] POLLUTING WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE 279 
 
anywhere in the organization.”101  Over the more than eighteen 
months of investigations, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board “found 
problems at Texas City just about everywhere they looked: 
antiquated equipment, corroded pipes about to burst, and safety 
alarms that did not work.”102  The result, as discussed infra in 
Part V: BP paid a $50 million fine and the Texas City facility was 
statutorily debarred, but BP was allowed to continue to do 
business with the government.103  Five years later, Deepwater 
Horizon occurred. 
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
The example of BP sheds light on some of the flaws of the 
current debarment system. Despite BP’s history of apparent 
noncompliance, accrual of fines and penalties associated with 
environmental misconduct, seeming lack of remediation and 
corrective action taken, and statutory debarment of individual BP 
facilities, the question remains: not why BP as an entire 
corporation—rather than just individual facilities or business 
units—has not already been debarred, but whether BP even could 
be discretionarily debarred.  While the current debarment 
regulatory framework is indeed effective in protecting the 
government from conducting business with small government 
contractors,104 the system is weak and largely ineffective in 
furthering the purposes of debarment when federal agencies 
contract with large corporations like BP.  Quite simply, some 
companies are too big to ban, providing these companies with the 
ability to essentially circumvent the threat of company-wide 
debarment when faced with the choice of whether to conduct 
themselves properly or whether to follow “business as usual” 
methods.  For some large companies who can afford the costs, it 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See BP P.L.C. Texas Refinery Explosion – Guilty, Fed. Contractor 
Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ 
index.cfm/1,73,222,html?CaseID=828 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 104. See, e.g., Burke v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 2d 238, 2390 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(representing an effective debarment process and result for a small government 
contractor who engaged in improper conduct demonstrating a lack of business 
integrity). 
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might be worth it to accept fines, penalties, and occasional facility 
debarment instead of changing their practices to come into 
compliance with environmental regulations. 
To illustrate, the top 100 government contractors (as 
measured by total amount of federal dollars awarded through 
government contracts) have paid more than $25 billion in 
penalties for fraud, bribery, falsifying records and other violations 
over the past fifteen years, but only four of them have been 
suspended at any point during that time from government 
contracting on a company-wide basis, and none have been 
debarred.105  These companies are Boeing, GTSI, IBM, L-3 
Communications, and Agility (formerly PWC Logistics, not a Top 
100 contractor).106  These are primarily defense contractors and 
providers of technological goods and services, companies not 
regularly involved in types of services giving rise to 
environmental violations (like oil and gas companies).  
Additionally, there has not been one company among the Top 100 
federal government contractors since 1995 that has been 
suspended or debarred on a company-wide basis for an 
environmental violation.107 
The statistics involving the largest oil, gas, and natural 
resources companies with regard to misconduct, on the other 
hand, are particularly telling.  BP, for example, was ranked sixty-
fifth in total federal contract award dollars in FY2010 ($1,033.3 
 
 105. See Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 106. For descriptions of these companies, see Boeing Comp., Fed. Contractor 
Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ 
index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=13&ranking=2 (last visited Nov. 13, 
2011); GTSI Corp., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=28 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011); IBM Corp., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, 
POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html? 
ContractorID=32 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011); L-3 Communications, Fed. 
Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=37 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011); Agility (formerly PWC Logistics), Fed. Contractor 
Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ 
index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=62 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 107. See generally Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
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million) but has the highest number of instances of misconduct 
since 1995 (fifty-seven instances, tied with Lockheed Martin and 
Exxon Mobil) and paid the fourth highest amount of dollars in the 
forms of fines and penalties ($2,653.2 million “misconduct 
dollars”) since 1995.108  Exxon Mobil, ranked 124th in total federal 
contract dollars ($232.3 million) in FY2010, is tied with BP and 
Lockheed Martin for the highest number of instances of 
misconduct (57) since 1995, and paid the fifth highest amount of 
misconduct dollars ($2,513.5 million) since 1995.109  Chevron 
Texaco ranked 132nd in total federal contract dollars ($93.1 
million) in FY2010 but likewise has a disproportionate share of 
instances of misconduct and payment of fines and penalties due 
to these violations—eighth in instances of misconduct (35) since 
1995 and twenty-second in misconduct dollars paid ($508.5 
million) since 1995.110  Clearly, these major oil and gas companies 
are paying exceedingly large fines and penalties in response to a 
high number of instances of misconduct, disproportionately more 
than what their total pool of federal contract dollars would 
indicate.  And yet, none of these major companies have ever been 
suspended or debarred on a company-wide basis, a perplexing 
result given the FAR’s mandate to debar contractors for the 
“commission of any other offense indicating a lack of business 
integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects 
the present responsibility of a Government contractor or 
subcontractor.”111 
So why are large government contractors like BP, Exxon 
Mobil, and Chevron Texaco consistently paying millions of dollars 
in fines and penalties related to environmental violations but not 
being debarred?  It is true that large corporations are often better 
 
 108. See BP P.L.C., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, http:// 
www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=61&rank
ing=65 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 109. See Exxon Mobil, Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, POGO.ORG, 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html?ContractorID=23 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 110. See Chrevon Texaco Corp., Fed. Contractor Misconduct Database, 
POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,html? 
ContractorID=140      (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). 
 111. FAR 9.406-2(a)(5) (setting forth causes for debarment); id. at 9.407-2(a)(9) 
(setting forth causes for suspension). 
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able to identify and correct misconduct than smaller companies, 
which may account for the low rate of suspensions and 
debarments for the largest contractors when you consider 
agencies’ focus on remediation, mitigation, and correction of 
misconduct.112  Likewise, at small companies, the person 
responsible for the misconduct might be the company leader, 
critical to making or providing what the government needs, which 
might warrant debarment for a small company but not 
necessarily large companies.113 
However, discerning the real answer involves a much more 
thorough investigation.  As mentioned previously, the company 
might simply be too big and involved in the government process 
to logistically be suspended or debarred by the contracting 
agency.  It is not necessarily because the agency failed to 
diligently and enthusiastically pursue administrative options like 
suspension and debarment but, rather, because of the greater 
defects of the system as a whole.  For example, a provision in the 
FAR provides that if “compelling reasons” related to national 
security or urgency exist to dictate the need to use the particular 
contractor or subcontractor in question, debarment may be 
avoided.114  Given that BP supplies eighty percent of the fuel to 
the military stationed in the Middle East,115 these circumstances 
might prove to be “compelling reasons” to not debar BP as a 
government contractor.  This gives the contracting agency an 
incredible amount of discretion, perhaps too much.  EPA 
routinely and discretionarily suspends and debars smaller 
companies and individual facilities that have CWA or CAA 
violations pursuant to their authority under section 508 of the 
CWA and section 306 of the CAA.  BP’s case is different because 
of the Defense Department’s extreme reliance on BP’s services.116 
Furthermore, the government might be wary of interrupting 
oil and gas production that could affect energy prices or taking 
 
 112. See Ron Nixon, Size Protects Government Contractors That Stray, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/us/ 
politics/18contractor.html. 
 113. See id. 
 114. FAR 9.405-1(b). 
 115. See Leopold, supra note 74. 
 116. Id. 
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action that could threaten the jobs of thousands of BP employees, 
not to mention that the cost of replacing BP as a contractor might 
be too high to justify the debarment of such a large entity.  Thus, 
the Department of Defense would not debar BP because of its 
strong ties and reliance on BP, just as EPA would not debar BP 
on a company-wide basis for other “compelling” policy reasons.  In 
addition, the Department of Justice’s pending litigation of 
Deepwater Horizon might have a residual effect on an agency’s 
decision whether to debar BP.  One of the penalty factors set forth 
in section 311(b)(8) of the CWA includes the economic impact of 
the penalty on the violator, i.e., the financial ability to pay a 
penalty.117  If BP were debarred by the EPA for environmental 
misconduct-related reasons or by another agency for other 
reasons, BP would argue during Deepwater Horizon settlement 
discussions that debarment will impact their future earnings and 
thus their ability to pay.  Even though debarment decisions 
should not be based on ongoing litigation but rather on agency-
specific internal decision making procedures, the result 
nevertheless may be that the agency might be influenced by the 
effect a debarment might have on the pending litigation.118  It 
seems, therefore, that BP and other large corporate entities with 
whom the government frequently contracts have found a loophole 
in the debarment regime. 
Despite this problem, there is an answer.  The FAR allows for 
the continuation of current contracts, providing that: 
“[n]otwithstanding the debarment, suspension, or proposed 
debarment of a contractor, agencies may continue contracts or 
 
 117. CWA § 311(b)(8), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(8) (“In determining the amount of a 
civil penalty . . . the Administrator, Secretary, or the court . . . shall consider the 
seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit to the violator, if 
any, resulting from the violation, the degree of culpability involved, any other 
penalty for the same incident, any history of prior violations, the nature, extent, 
and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or mitigate the 
effects of the discharge, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and 
any other matters as justice may require.”) (emphasis added). 
 118. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, 
Deputy Attorney General, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/ 
corporate_guidelines.htm (“Prosecutors should also be aware of non-penal 
sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, such as potential suspension 
or debarment from eligibility for government contracts.”). 
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subcontracts in existence at the time the contractor was debarred, 
suspended, or proposed for debarment unless the agency head 
directs otherwise.”119  In other words, a suspension or debarment 
is intended to only have future effect on the ability to contract.  
While it may, indeed, be logistically more difficult for an agency 
to find a new contractor to replace a newly suspended or debarred 
contractor, there should in theory be no effect upon the currently-
existing contract.  This should provide time for the agency to 
solicit bids and award a new contract to interested and qualified 
contractors with strong track records of compliance and business 
integrity who will comply with the ethical and legal demands that 
the FAR places on them.  Reforms to the FAR should be made to 
account for situations where a current contract is set to expire 
(and before a new contract can be awarded to a presently 
responsible contractor) in order to allow an agency head to be 
able to extend the life of the current contract until the new one 
can begin. 
Despite these logistical hurdles, debarment of a large 
multinational corporation like BP on a company-wide basis could 
be a very real possibility, which would be a certain method for the 
government to ensure that they no longer conduct business with a 
corporation that has so irresponsibly behaved in connection with 
their federal contracts, or at least until the company is able to 
adequately demonstrate its business integrity and commitment 
towards environmental ethics.  Even before the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion, EPA debarring officials were considering 
discretionary debarment of the entire company regarding its 
unresolved debarment cases in Alaska and Texas.120  At present, 
the EPA Suspension and Debarment Office has “temporarily 
suspended” any further discussion with BP on debarment matters 
until the completion of an investigation into the Deepwater 
Horizon can be concluded.121  Should EPA ultimately decide to 
 
 119. FAR 9.405-1(a). 
 120. See Lustgarten, supra note 75. 
 121. Id. (“. . . the EPA suspended negotiations with the petroleum giant over 
whether it would be barred from federal contracts because of the environmental 
crimes it committed before the spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  Officials said they are 
putting the talks on hold until they learn more about the British company's 
responsibility for the plume of oil that is spreading across the Gulf.”) 
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debar BP, the effects on the company would be sweeping: “Even a 
temporary expulsion from the U.S. could be devastating for BP’s 
business.”122  A discretionary debarment would cancel not only 
the company’s future contracts to sell fuel to the military, but 
prohibit BP from leasing or renewing drilling leases on federal 
land as well as cancel other contracts BP holds with other 
agencies, resulting in losses worth billions of dollars.123  In the 
end, the question is not whether BP could be debarred as a 
government contractor but, rather, will they?  Rep. Bart Stupak 
(D-Mich.) said it best: “the U.S. government needs to look at all 
possible options when it comes to showing BP, or any corporate 
bad actor, that a continued culture of cost cutting and increased 
risk taking will absolutely not be tolerated.”124 
If the federal government is actually serious about 
conducting business with presently responsible corporate 
partners to protect the public interest—and not just with a 
smattering of smaller contractors—reforms need to be made to 
the regulatory framework and agencies need to begin following 
the rhetoric they preach.  To demonstrate the government’s 
stated policies with its contradictory actions, the Department of 
Justice’s internal guidance on prosecuting business organizations 
states: 
In evaluating the severity of collateral consequences, various 
factors . . . such as the pervasiveness of the criminal conduct and 
the adequacy of the corporation’s compliance programs, should be 
considered in determining the weight to be given to this factor. 
For instance, the balance may tip in favor of prosecuting 
corporations in situations where the scope of the misconduct in a 
case is widespread and sustained within a corporate division (or 
spread throughout pockets of the corporate organization). In such 
cases, the possible unfairness of visiting punishment for the 
corporation’s crimes upon shareholders may be of much less 
concern where those shareholders have substantially profited, 
even unknowingly, from widespread or pervasive criminal 
activity. Similarly, where the top layers of the corporation’s 
management or the shareholders of a closely-held corporation 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Smith, supra note 73. 
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were engaged in or aware of the wrongdoing and the conduct at 
issue was accepted as a way of doing business for an extended 
period, debarment may be deemed not collateral, but a direct and 
entirely appropriate consequence of the corporation’s 
wrongdoing.125 
Yet, BP and others like them know that the current system 
treats these large contractors as “special” and that although they 
may have to pay millions of dollars in administrative and 
criminal fines and penalties in connection with their 
environmental misconduct, the system would never allow them to 
be debarred or suspended on a company-wide basis—a far more 
catastrophic result to their business than the payment of fines 
and penalties.  It is not until federal agencies begin to actually 
follow through on their congressional and executive mandates 
and debar companies, even the largest ones, for their continuous 
and systematic civil and criminal misconduct that the true goals 
of the debarment regime can be accomplished. 
How might these reforms be realistically made?  First, 
statutory debarment provisions like in the CWA and CAA need to 
be strengthened to allow for the automatic or mandatory 
debarment of contractors on a company-wide basis and not just 
applicable to individual facilities where the violation occurred.  
Continuation of the current practice allows deep pocket 
companies like BP to continue conducting themselves in an 
environmentally irresponsible way without ever having to 
seriously face the threat of company-wide debarment, a far 
greater deterrent than fines and penalties.  Of course, fairness 
and economic concerns dictate that company-wide statutory 
debarments cannot and should not be designated for every 
violation of a statutory debarment provision.  However, the 
inclusion of language in the FAR, or even in the CWA and CAA, 
giving the agency head the ability to debar contractors on a 
company-wide basis based on the egregiousness of the violation or 
 
 125. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy 
Attorney General, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm 
(emphasis added). 
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continued history of noncompliance would be effective in giving 
actual teeth to debarment. 
Second, while agencies must be able to have some discretion 
and flexibility as to their ability to grant exceptions for 
“compelling reasons,”126 they cannot rely on it so heavily so as to 
effectively provide an escape route for large companies like BP.  
Agencies must lead by example and demonstrate that 
government contractor misconduct will not go unnoticed in terms 
of willingness to actually debar entire companies.  To that end, 
diversifying the entities that agencies contract with will enable 
the government to not rely so heavily on the services of the big 
companies.  By doing that, the government will have appropriate 
alternatives available should a business partner engage in 
irresponsible or illicit behavior, while simultaneously spreading 
the wealth with small businesses struggling to survive in a shaky 
economy.  How many more Deepwater Horizon oil spills must 
result before agencies are willing to follow their congressional 
mandates? 
Finally, because debarment is not always a logistical 
possibility, other remedial options besides traditional “business 
as usual” fines and penalties might, at the least, work towards 
accomplishing the goals of environmental protection.  Instead, 
because the FAR is an all-encompassing regulation and does not 
deal exclusively with environmental crimes or misconduct, EPA 
Guidance recommending Supplemental Environmental Projects 
(SEPs) in lieu of or in addition to fines or penalties paid to the 
Treasury might be a solution.127 Although SEPs are meant to be 
 
 126. FAR 9.405-1(b). 
 127. Generally, a SEP is an action undertaken by an alleged violator to engage 
in an environmentally beneficial project related to the violation in exchange for 
mitigation of the penalty to be paid.  Usually, SEPs are made as part of an 
enforcement settlement, which carries certain legal requirements: “There must 
be a relationship between the underlying violation and the human health or 
environmental benefits that will result from the SEP; [a] SEP must improve, 
protect, or reduce risks to public health or the environment, although in some 
cases a SEP may, as a secondary matter, also provide the violator with certain 
benefits; the SEP must be undertaken in settlement of an enforcement action as 
a project that the violator is not otherwise legally required to perform.” See 
Supplemental Environmental Projects, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/civil/ 
seps/ (last updated June 6, 2011). 
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“undertaken in settlement of an enforcement action,”128 this does 
not mean that a SEP requirement could not be added to the FAR 
to ensure as optimal a result as possible.  Adding such additional 
environmental compliance tools to the arsenal of federal agencies 
would be effective in demonstrating the government’s real 
commitment to environmental enforcement and compliance, and, 
in the event that an irresponsible contractor cannot be debarred, 
at least the contractor would be engaging in otherwise ethical and 
beneficial behavior aimed at the betterment of society and 
attainment of the goals of the respective environmental statutes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Suspension and debarment is a critical tool available to the 
government to protect itself from conducting business with 
irresponsible and unethical business partners.  Although not 
intended to be punitive in nature, the realistic effects of 
suspension and debarment on government contractors can 
provide a needed deterrent effect to ensure that contractors 
engage in ethical and presently responsible behavior.  Regarding 
the suspension or debarment of small companies or individuals, 
the current system is effective at protecting the government and 
public interest.  However, because of regulatory and practical 
flaws in statutory and discretionary debarment, large 
corporations with long histories of environmental noncompliance, 
violations, convictions, and irresponsible behavior like BP are 
beating the system.  Because of the government’s overreliance on 
large contractors, it is unable to adequately protect itself from 
irresponsible business partners when those companies engage in 
environmental crimes and misconduct and they are able to avoid 
the harsher effects of company-wide debarment.  Regulatory 
reform to the FAR and changes in agency contracting practice is 
needed to accomplish the sensible goals of suspension and 
debarment. 
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